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Abstract
We present results of 1189 structured interviews about price-setting behavior of ﬁrms in the manufacturing
and services sector in Pakistan. Our discoveries are that frequency of price change is considerably high, low-
ering the real impact of monetary policy. The remaining price stickiness is explained by ﬁrms caring about
relative prices and the persistence of shocks. The exchange-rate and cost shocks are more important than
ﬁnancial and demand shocks for both setting prices and also the readiness with which these pass-through
to the economy. Firms with connections with the informal sector, especially through demand, have a lower
probability of price adjustment.
JEL Classiﬁcation: E32, E52, O11.
I Introduction
The idea of sticky prices is at the heart of modern day macroeconomics for explaining economic ﬂuctuations
over the short horizon. It implies that instead of being vertical the aggregate supply curve is upward sloping.
Therefore, ﬂuctuations in aggregate demand can cause ﬂuctuations in output. This setup is fundamental
for monetary policy as it determines the extent to which money growth, with its inﬂuence on aggregate
demand, can inﬂuence the real economy. As it is commonly implied that lengthier the period between price
changes the greater the inﬂuence of monetary policy. Therefore it is quintessential to empirically establish
the extent and the nature of sticky prices.
Until recently there had been a gap between theoretical explanations of price-stickiness and studies of
their empirical importance. Partly in response to this gap and partly because of the apparent success over
the last two decades of monetary policy in curbing inﬂation, central bankers and academics of advanced
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1economies have devoted much resources to empirical study of price stickiness.2 To name a few studies
Rotemberg (1982), Carlton (1986), Cecchetti (1986), Kashyap (1995), Blinder (1991), Blinder et al. (1998),
Taylor (1999), Aspland, Eriksson and Freiberg (2000), Hall, Walsh and Yates (2000), Bils and Klenow
(2004), Levy, Datta and Bergen (2002), Amirault et al. (2005) and more recently Fabiani et al. (2007) and
Nakamura and Steisson (2008). This large literature for U.S. and European countries shows that the degree
of price-stickiness is considerable and pricing strategies are complicated.
However, the corresponding eÆort to study price-stickiness in developing economies leaves much to be
desired. Such a study is all the more important in light of the growing literature that documents for the
contrasting features of the developing world such as: (i) procyclical monetary policies, (ii) persistence of
inﬂation levels in the double-digits and (iii) higher than average volatilities of annualized inﬂation rates (see
especially Ag´ enor and Montiel (2010) and Frankel (2010) and the literature therein). Furthermore, with
the expected rise of the emerging markets as world economic engines it will become increasingly important
to study in detail the behavior of their product markets and the extent to which they diÆer from that of the
developed world.
In this paper, we present results of 1189 face-to-face structured interviews carried out in 2009 to 2011 with
entrepreneurs representing the formal ﬁrms in the manufacturing and services sector of Pakistan. By formal
it is meant that our ﬁrms are o±cially registered, tax liable and also report data to employment agencies.
Therefore, these ﬁrms necessarily take part in the o±cial GDP and employment statistics. This study is
comparable to similar research work in developed countries in that key questions were benchmarked and
drawn from the pioneering works by Blinder (1991) and Blinder et al. (1998) for the U.S. and Fabiani et al
(2007) for the Euro area. The interviewers inquired about the nature of the product market, frequency of price
reviews and price changes, key explanation for price-stickiness, dissemination of economic shocks, and the
nature of interaction with the informal sector entrepreneurs. Understanding the linkages with the informal
sector is important given that in Pakistan informal economy3 employs more than 70% of non-agricultural
labor force.4
To the authors’ knowledge, features such as the scale of structured interviews (only Blinder et al. (2007)
for US, Amirault et al. (2005) for Canada and to a smaller extent Loupias and Ricart (2004) for France used
structured interviews), sectoral coverage, updated list of price theories and questions on the informal sector
makes our survey the ﬁrst exercise of its kind jointly conducted by a central bank and statistical agencies.
Furthermore, this study is a good test for the universality of a great number of price theories developed by
economists over the last few decades.
A few words on the macroeconomic situation of Pakistan at the time of the interviews (Dec 2009-Jun
2011) before the presentation of key results. In November 2008, Pakistan entered a 23 month IMF program
(the 11th since 1988) after a balance-of-payments crisis in May 2008. The average annualized inﬂation rates
for Pakistan during the three months of the interviews in Punjab was 12.5%, and one year of survey in Sindh
was 14%; which is 4-6% above Pakistan’s 50 year trend. During the ﬁscal year 2010 (i.e. July 2009-June
2010) real GDP was projected to grow at 4% and the annual unemployment rate was 5.5%.5 Monetary
policy was conducted under a dirty-ﬂoat with an implicit inﬂation and growth rate targets of 9% and 3.3%
respectively.
We establish twelve stylized facts about price-setting behavior in Pakistan’s formal manufacturing and
services sectors and compare them with pervious work where possible:
Fact 1 The median frequency of price changes in the manufacturing and services sector is 6 and 2 times
a year respectively. The equivalent ﬁgures are 1 and 1.4 times a year in Europe and US respectively. This
result translates to at least one-quarter of Pakistan’s GDP being repriced 3 times a year;
Fact 2 Prices are rigid downwards and more so for the services sector; a result consistent with previous
work;
2For example, the European Central Bank has a large team working under the aegis of ’ Inﬂation Persistence Network’ to
study prices.
3with its output evaluated at least one-third of reported GDP (see Arby, Hanif and Malik (2010))
4Pakistan Labor Force Survey 2009-10.
5The uno±cial unemployment rates are higher but they are hard to assess as 70% of the typical non-agricultural household0s
working hour are spent in the informal sector.
2Fact 3 Formal ﬁrms are relatively more sensitive and promptly accommodate to changes in (a) overall
cost in particular that of energy and intermediate inputs, (b) competitors’ prices and (c) exchange rate.
However changes in demand and ﬁnancial-costs matter less. This is consistent with previous literature for
developed countries with the main diÆerence being that labor costs relative to energy costs were found to
be more relevant for them;
Fact 4 Time dependent price rules are more common than state-dependent ones, with 51% of ﬁrms using
the former; while for developed economies the same ﬁgure is 33%;
Fact 5 The top three reasons for delaying price changes upwards are: (a) the fear that other ﬁrms will
not follow (b) the uncertainty that shocks might be temporary and (c) the fear of customer retaliation. The
ﬁrst and the third reasons are in line with the results from developed economies;
Fact 6 37% of owners reported that prices are benchmarked to competitor’s price, while 47% reported
setting prices on the basis of constant or variable markup. The same ﬁgures stand at 27% and 52% re-
spectively for developed countries. However, there is considerable imperfect competition in all types of
economies;
Fact 7 The manufacturing sector–where costs of raw material account for 70% of total cost– responds
more to cost shocks relative to the services sector– where labor costs account for 40% of total cost;
Fact 8 All ﬁrms, big or small, use backward and forward-looking information sets in making price
decisions. In particular, 46% of ﬁrms use a combination of backward and forecast information while only
29% use pure forecasts. In contrast, the use of forecast information is considerably higher in developed
countries with 55% of ﬁrms relying on it;
The remaining facts are particular to the linkages between formal and informal sector as viewed by formal
sector entrepreneurs:
Fact 9 43% of formal ﬁrms interviewed interact with the informal sector either through demand or
supply channels;
Fact 10 Economies of scale, customer preferences and market power motivates formal ﬁrms to remain
in the formal sector;
Fact 11 According to formal ﬁrms, tax exemptions and weak enforcement are the main reasons for the
existence of informal sector;
Fact 12 Formal ﬁrms with frequent interaction with the informal sector tend to have relatively lower
probability of price change suggesting that interactions with informal economy serve as shock absorbers; in
particular demand shocks.
This paper presents results with the US and the Eurozone where possible and is organized as follows.
Section II presents the research design. Sections III-VII discuss various aspects of pricing. Section VIII
presents caveats of our study while a ﬁnal Section concludes.
II The Research Design
We adopted structured-interviews approach for our survey for three reasons: complexity of questionnaire,
potential poor response rate through traditional mail and the fear that questionnaire might not reach the
appropriate person. Generally, lower response rates does not necessarily indicate any bias, especially if
distributed systematically across the sample. However, we apply a post stratiﬁcation scheme based on ﬁrms’
size and economic activity to reduces this bias. This proved important as we had a lower response rate for
larger ﬁrms. Other surveys such as Kwapil et al. (2005) and Loupias and Ricart (2004)also ﬁnd similar
large ﬁrm behviour. Despite the higher cost, face-to-face interviews are considered to produce higher quality
results and a higher response rate. They also reduce the possibility of ﬂuke answers, provide direct access
to the suitable individual and allow interviewers to carry out a longer list of queries.
Overall, the literature recognizes the potential of Blinder’s unorthodox survey approach. Indeed, no less
than 17 developed countries have used impersonal questionnaires (via e-mail or post) to study the pricing
pattern6 in the manufacturing and services sectors. Nonetheless, with all qualitative surveys (structured
interviews or otherwise) there is the danger of misinterpretation by respondents with the slightest change
6The U.S. used structured interviews.
3in the wording of the questions leading to disproportionate responses. In many cases respondents may use
intuition rather than what they do in practice to respond to the questions.
In full recognition of the possibility that these challenges might be more acute for a developing country,
we teamed up with statistical agencies of Pakistan.7 They selected experienced interviewers with local know-
how and contacts to conduct our survey. The State Bank provided focused training (both theoretical and
practical) to the interviewers for complex real world situations, where they need to elaborate and explain
the questions for clarity. State Bank also conducted two separate pilots before launching the study. For a
further quality check, economists from the State Bank randomly audited 10% of live interviews.
The face-to-face interviews took place between December 2009 and June 2011. The study began in
Punjab in December 2009 and ended in March 2010. In Sindh, it was launched in June 2010 and ended in
June 2011. The services sector interviews in Sindh are currently ongoing.
The Questionnaire
The questionnaire is benchmarked to Blinder (1991) and the collection of studies in Fabiani et al. (2007).
This is imperative as it allows us to draw parallels between developing and developed economies. In line with
previous work, section A of our questionnaire contains questions on the general proﬁle of the ﬁrm as well as
queries on the types of customer and the nature of competition in their respective market. Section B, C, and
D contain questions on various aspects of price setting of the main product–one with highest domestic sales.
Section E contains queries on existing theories of price-stickiness and dissemination of shocks. Section F
contains queries on the interlinkages between formal and informal sector.
In order to better capture the ground realities of Pakistani economy, the questionnaire was customized in
following ways: First, we asked formal ﬁrms about their interactions and views on informal sector. Second,
we asked entrepreneurs to provide us with a breakdown of their cost structure. Third, in the section on
price-dissemination we paid particular attention to the eÆects of external shocks on prices. Indeed, Pakistan
is exceptionally vulnerable to external shocks with 11 IMF programmes since 1988.8 This is important as
little is known about shock transmission in developing countries at the micro level.
On testing side, the newly designed questionnaire was tested between ourselves and crucially on a separate
sample of 50 randomly selected ﬁrms in Karachi; Pakistan’s largest metropolis. The ﬁnal questionnaire was
then translated into the local language. Selected questions from questionnaire are attached in Appendix B.
Sampling
We covered the ‘formal’ manufacturing and services sector in the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The other
two provinces of the country (Balochistan and Khyber-Pakhtun Khwa) were avoided due to safety reasons
at the time of the interviews. Our focus on the lager provinces and sectors ensures that our results are a
good representative of the pricing pattern of formal sector in Pakistan.
Table 1 provides details of the sample. As of June 2011, 1189 structured interviews were completed. Of
these interviews, 1025 are from the manufacturing sector with 286 (that is 28%) out of 1025 from the Sindh
province. The services sector accounted for 14% of the sample but this percentage will rise given the ongoing
interviews in Sindh. In practice, most of the price-setting surveys in Euro area are biased towards industry,
due to the nature of the survey.
The frame for the manufacturing sector consists of all ﬁrms which reported in the last census of man-
ufacturing industries (CMI). The manufacturing sector is dominated by certain type of economic activities
as well as having a greater share of small sized ﬁrms. Therefore, a purely random sample would run the
risk of having a biased sample towards these activities and ﬁrms. To overcome this problem, stratiﬁed ran-
dom sampling was used. The ﬁrms were stratiﬁed on the basis of economic activity and ﬁrm size. The
manufacturing sample covers ﬁrms with International Standard Industrial Classiﬁcation (ISIC) economic
7These agencies are well-equipped for this exercise as they conduct the census of the manufacturing sector in Pakistan.
8See www.imf.org.
4activity codes from 15 to 36 (excluding 30).9 The population of ﬁrms for above mentioned sub-sectors of
manufacturing sector was split into three categories of employment brackets: 10- 50, 51-250 and more than
250 employees. On the basis of these classiﬁcations, a random sample for manufacturing sector was drawn
from 63 mutually exclusive strata. We drew a sample of 1200 ﬁrms for the manufacturing sector in Sindh
and Punjab, along with a replacement-sample representing 50% of the original sample was also drawn to
cover the possibility of non-response. In case of non-response, a ﬁrm from a particular stratum was replaced
by another ﬁrm from the same stratum to maintain sectoral representation.
The sampling for services sector is more complicated in that there is no formal population frame of
ﬁrms in services sector easily available to us. Therefore, we used the database of Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan (SECP) which maintains a complete list of ﬁrms registered with them. However,
the SECP frame lacks information on ﬁrm size and dormant/ non-dormant status of ﬁrms. We, therefore,
impose the following constraints on the sample selection in the services sector. First, to minimize the chance
of selecting dormant ﬁrms from a massive database, we only selected ﬁrms that had been registered within
the last 10 years and if registered before that time period have reported to SECP at least once in the
last 10 years.10 Second, to avoid small ﬁrm bias, only ﬁrms with paid-up capital more than RS. 2,000,000
(USD 23500) were selected in our sample . Third, we only included ﬁrms involved in economic activities
where it is possible to identify a main service. A random sample of 270 ﬁrms was selected from transport
and telecommunication, hotels and restaurants, education and health care services on the basis of sectoral
distribution. With above limitations, results for services sector should be interpreted cautiously as they only
reﬂect price-setting behavior for selected services and not from a well-deﬁned sample frame. We, therefore,




Small 573 103 676
Medium 291 40 331
Large 161 21 182
Total 1025 164 1189
Sindh Representation 28% 37%
Notes: Position as 30th June 2011
To draw valid inferences for population on the basis of this sample, it was necessary to post-stratify
the data to control for possible selection biases due to either closure of some selected ﬁrms, ﬁrms being
sole-exporter of their product or ﬁrms shifting to new economic activity. Similarly, large ﬁrms’ decisions are
likely to be more important also we had low response rate from larger ﬁrms so data needed to be adjusted
for ﬁrm size as well. Furthermore, aggregated results appear under nomenclature ’total’ in our Tables. For
this, we reweighed the data on the basis of sector weights in the population. The Appendix contains details
of the post stratiﬁcation scheme.
Generally, manufacturing and services sectors combined accounted for 71.4% of GDP in 2009. How-
ever, taking only into consideration the subsectors that are covered in our interviews, our ﬁnal sample is
representative of decisions-makers that produce 25.2–27 % of GDP. The under-representation of services
sector is noticeable but common in other international price related studies as well. This is because it is
not straight forward to deﬁne the main product for some services sector ﬁrms. Services like ﬁnancial ser-
vices, construction, retail and trade were not included where product usually changes with every transaction.
Also, in our case the sample frame for the services sector was not available. Given the list of subsectors
9The activities are: 15-(food products & beverages), 16-(tobacco products), 17-(manufacture of textiles), 18-(wearing ap-
parel), 19-(leather products), 20-(wood & wood products), 21-(paper & paper products), 22-(publishing, printing & reproduc-
tion), 23-(petroleum), 24-(chemicals & chemical products), 25-(rubber & plastics products), 26-(other non-metallic mineral
products), 27-(basic metals), 28-(fabricated metal products), 29-(machinery & equipment N.E.C.), 31-(electrical machinery &
apparatus N.E.C.), 32-(radio, TV & communication equipment), 33-(medical & optical instruments), 34-(motor vehicles &
trailers), 35-(other transport equipment), 36-(furniture).
10Every ﬁrm registered with SECP has the obligation to report its statistics on annual basis but few do so on regular basis.
5in the manufacturing and the services sectors, on aggregate we believe to have captured a true picture of




% GDP in Pakistan 2009 18.3 53.1 71.4
% of GDP represented by our sample† 12.2 13-15 25.2-27
% of sector in our sample 86 14 100
% Replacement 18 15 18
†: this percentage is used for reweighing the manufacturing and services sector estimates
III The Environment
In majority of the cases, interviews were conducted once the company bosses had agreed to be interviewed.
In a few cases, we were asked to leave our questionnaire behind and come back to conduct the interview at
a later date.
To a great extent price determination and its adjustment depends on the market structure. The struc-
tured interview approach addressed this issue by asking about ﬁrm size, importance of the main product for
the ﬁrm, ﬁrm’s position in the market, and the quality of ﬁrm’s relationship with customers.
The questions focused on the dominant product of a given ﬁrm in terms of turnover in Pakistan. In
manufacturing and services sector we found turnover generated by main product to be 77 % and 85 %
respectively. Furthermore, national market was the main market for 95% of manufacturing and 86% of
services sectors ﬁrms for their main product in our sample. This implies that our survey results present
a representative picture of pricing pattern at the ﬁrm level in Pakistan. This suits our needs as we are
primarily interested in understanding the pricing-pattern in Pakistan. International penetration of the main
product in Pakistan is at least three times lower compared to the Euro zone.
6TABLE 3
Market and competition of the main product
Manufacturing Services Euro Zone Average†
Reference Market
i. International 5 14 27
ii. Local Market (City and Surrounding Areas) 33 37
iii. National Market excluding (ii). 62 49
iv. ii+iii 95 86 73





Top ﬁrm 5 11
Top four ﬁrms 13 22
Top ten ﬁrms 17 22
Not among the top 10 ﬁrms 37 41
Main Customer and long-term relationship
Other Firms 79 34 75
Customers 20 58 21
Public Sector 2 8 3
All long term relationships 56 36 70
Perceived Degree of Competition
Very High 47 56 26
High 26 24 35
Medium 22 15 21
Weak 2 3 17
†: Weighted by country’s GDP in Fabiani et al. (2007).
As for the interaction with customers, majority (80% on average) of manufacturing sector ﬁrms sell their
main product to other ﬁrms. While in services sector 58% of the ﬁrms directly deal with ﬁnal customers.
This implies that the results of our interviews refer to producers prices for the manufacturing sector and
customer prices for the services sector. European and U.S. price surveys have found very similar features.
Furthermore, for ﬁrms in our sample majority of customers (56% manufacturing and 36% services) tend to
be repeat customers. However, the share of repeat customers in our sample of Pakistani ﬁrms is less than
Europe, where 70% of sales are based on long-term clients.
Table 3 eludes to the degree of competition in manufacturing and services sectors. Majority of ﬁrms
perceive that market competition is high or very high in the industry. The share of ﬁrms claiming to operate
in a medium or weak competition is 24% and 18% for manufacturing and services sector respectively. This
implies that markets are more competitive in Pakistan than in Euro zone where 40% of ﬁrms perceive
competition to be weak. This ﬁnding is further corroborated by the fact that 37% and 41% of ﬁrms in
manufacturing and services sector respectively place themselves not to be amongst the top ten ﬁrms.
In sum, one infers that there is a monopolistic environment in Pakistan with ﬁrms usually having long-
term relationship with customers. However, this environment is more competitive than Europe and the
proportion of ﬁrms with long-term relationship with customers is smaller.
IV A Proﬁle of Price Setting
This section is devoted to price-setting behavior of ﬁrms in our sample, namely, the basis on which prices
are set, revised and their frequencies.11 In previous section, we found indications of imperfect competition
11We deal with wage-stickiness in a separate paper.
7in Pakistan. This result is further consolidated by the ﬁnding in Table 4 that 34% and 63% of ﬁrms in
the manufacturing and services sectors reported applying the markup rule of pricing. Overall, 47% of our
representative decision-makers that produce one-quarter of GDP use the markup rule. Surprisingly, the
word ‘markup’ is commonly used in Pakistan to denote unit proﬁt margin in local-language . A further 44%
and 29% of manufacturing and services sector ﬁrms reported following their competitors in setting prices.
Overall, the numbers are not too diÆerent from the results in Europe, with the main diÆerence being the use
of markup rule in services sector in Pakistan is relatively higher, which implies that prices should change
















†: Includes markups that are constant and variables in-
cluding those to customers
‡: Includes prices determined by association and the gov-
ernment.
These results ﬁrmly establish the existence of imperfect competition in Pakistan and hence that ﬁrms set
prices themselves. The feature to establish next are the foundations of price reassessments. To establish
these features we ignore prices determined by government. The academic literature identiﬁes three methods
of evaluation: (i) at regular time interval Taylor (1980)and Calvo (1983) (ii) on the basis of speciﬁc events
Barro (1972), Sheshinski and Weiss (1983) and Caplin and Leahy (1997) and (iii) a combination of the
former two. It is also possible for ﬁrms to mix both methods of price adjustment. Indeed, it is reasonable
to expect ﬁrms to accommodate for speciﬁc changes even when they generally adhere to a time interval for
price changes; this idea was ﬁrst debated in Hall et al. (2000) then further taken by Apel et al. (2005).
In Table 5, estimated weighted average of ﬁrms that review their prices at regular time-intervals is 51%
and a further 9% of ﬁrms review generally at regular time intervals, while also accommodating for speciﬁc
events. This implies that 60% of the ﬁrm change prices on the basis of time-dependent rules. These numbers
are similar to Blinder et al. (1998) for US and Hall et al. (2000) for UK where the ﬁgures are 60% and
70% respectively. In contrast, European ﬁgures from Fabiani et al. (2007) of 34% and for Sweden of
44.8% in Apel et al. (2005) are far lower. This diÆerence may be due to their market structure with a
signiﬁcantly higher proportion of long term customers and also the fact that Sweden and Euro zone had lower
inﬂationary environment at the time of their surveys. Therefore, for ﬁrms in their sample prices reviews
were only necessary on speciﬁc occasions. In the case of Pakistan, 50 year trend inﬂation of 8% implies
that it is imperative for ﬁrms to reassess prices more regularly. Table 5 also provides a breakdown for the
manufacturing and services sectors, and ﬁrm size. Note that both sectors are similar in the way prices are
reviewed. Moreover, the ﬁrm size is positively correlated with the regularity of price reviewing.
8TABLE 5


















We now turn our attention to measures of prices stickiness. This is crucial as it determines the extent to
which monetary policy can have real impact on the economy. As discussed earlier, frequent changes in prices
lower the length of price spells by making the aggregate supply curve steeper. In Table 6, we discuss the
key measure of price-stickiness by directly asking entrepreneurs about their actual number of price changes
in a typical year. The median12 number of price changes in Pakistan is three times a year for at least one
quarter of its GDP. This is almost 3 times what is found in the developed world. This implies that median
spell of a price change is 4 months. Furthermore, 24% of the ﬁrms change their prices within a month; a
number 50% and 14 % greater than what is found in studies on the Euro area and US respectively. We also
discover in Table 6, that at disaggregated level, manufacturing sector prices are much more ﬂexible than
prices in the services sector and ﬁrm size positively impacts the median frequency of price changes. This
implies that for manufacturing goods the duration of price spells is no longer than two months. The latter
results are also found in the developed economies but their signiﬁcance is not as sharp. It is also noticeable
that small ﬁrms and large ﬁrms have similar median number of price changes.
12The mean would be a misleading measure of central tendency as some ﬁrms change their prices on continuous basis. For
these ﬁrms we assume that prices change on daily basis to simplify our analysis.
9TABLE 6
Actual price changes
Pakistan Euro Zone US
Total
Median Number of Price Changes in a Year 3 1 1.4
Implied Median Spell of Price Change in Months† 4 12 8.6
% of Firms that Change Price Within a Month 23.9 15.9 20.9
Quarterly Calvo Probabilities using Median Duration‡ 0.25 0.75 0.65
% of Firms that Review their Prices With a Month 72.9 26 26










†: This is ratio of 12 and median of number of price changes in a year.
‡: The probability that ﬁrms do not re-optimize the prices they charge during a quarter
In sum, there are price rigidities in Pakistan but far less than what is found in developed economies.
There is higher degree of price rigidity in the services sector compared to the manufacturing sector. Large
ﬁrms change prices more frequently than smaller ones.
Price adjustments downward show a diÆerent pattern. Median price cuts happen once a year for man-
ufacturing sector, while for services sector this is only true over a long period of ﬁve years. Overall, for
both manufacturing and services sector price cuts tend to occur after two and half year showing considerable
downward price rigidity.
The empirical evidence presented on price stickiness with higher frequency of price change, have important
implications for policy-making in Pakistan.
First, monetary policy would have smaller impact on real economy than found in an environment with
lower frequency of price change. This happens because a smaller proportion of ﬁrms will have their actual
prices diÆerent from the optimal levels giving the policy maker a very small window of opportunity to aÆect
output.
To reiterate this point further, let us make the unlikely assumption that all features of the Pakistani
economy resemble that of the U.S. economy with the exception of diÆerent frequency of price change as in
Table 6. We plug this information in a simple quarterly Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
model of U.S. In our version, nominal price rigidity is the only source of friction with other standard
ingredients of monopolistic competition in the product market, monetary policy and balanced budget. In
Fig. 1, we present the impact of a one standard-deviation interest rate shock on the output gap. The real
impact of a policy shock on output for Pakistan is smaller with the brunt of its eÆect dying out within three
quarters. While on the other hand for the US case output falls 17% below its potential and eÆects of policy
shock dying out only after the 17th quarter. This simple exercise goes to show that using the assumption of
nominal price-rigidity to explain economic ﬂuctuations and persistence in real variables in emerging markets
such as Pakistan may not be the best idea.
Second, the higher frequency of price changes calls for policy-making and analysis to be based on data that
is at a frequency better than quarterly and quarterly at worst. This is conﬁrmed by the Calvo probabilities
in Table 6 which show that prices are optimized by a quarter.
Third, the ﬁnding that time-dependent rules are also applicable to high-frequency price changing economies
with relatively high inﬂation has not been documented previously in the literature to our knowledge. The
10Figure 1: The impact of an interest-rate shock on the output gap (y ° y§).
potential reason behind the puzzle is the frequency of price reviews. Price review within a month is the
most common practice in the Pakistani markets, where for US and Euro area the same proportion is only
one-quarter of ﬁrms. The time dependent ﬁrms with very high frequency of price reviews indicate that
despite the time dependent rule, the probability of re-optimizing prices increases with signiﬁcant diÆerences
between original and optimal prices. The behavior of such ﬁrm is likely to resemble state dependent ﬁrms.
Note that our pattern of pricing appears not to be conditioned by the choice of year as the ﬁrms provided
similar answers to what they actually did in 2008 and 2009.
These results naturally raise an important question for developing economies such as Pakistan. Models
based on time-dependent rules with fairly low frequency of aggregate price change and where these changes
are staggered are the mainstay of monetary economics for explaining persistence in inﬂation and output.
Next we ask what stops ﬁrms from changing prices even more frequently. To answer this question we
presented ﬁrms with an extensive list of statements, based on a manifold of theories, and asked them to
identify the ones that were used in the practical sense for delaying price adjustments.
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Ranking reasons for price stickiness
Theories Description Pakistan Europe US
Manufacturing Services
Coordination Failure Firms watch what other ﬁrms will
do ﬁrst
11 4 1
Temporary Shocks Firms avoid price changes if they
perceive a shock (demand or sup-




Customer might take the price
change as exploitative and antag-
onize
32 1 †
Procyclical Elasticities When times are good customers
become more price sensitive
45 6
Habit Formation When times are good share
of non-habitual customers with
higher price elasticities increases
56
†: In US ﬁrms were asked, out of freewill, to cite what in general stopped them from
changing prices and the largest majority said customer’s antagonism.
Firms were asked to evaluate the importance of diÆerent pricing theories for their pricing decisions on
the scale of: very important, important, of minor importance and unimportant. The responses were coded
from 1 to 4 respectively. The responses for the manufacturing and services sector were used to rank diÆerent
theories. In Table 7A, we present the results of top ﬁve explanations for the manufacturing sector and the
services sector. For comparison, we also present the results from U.S. and Euro zone.
The top three explanations for delaying price adjustment are: (i) ﬁrms prefer to act once they have
observed how their peers behave (82% of the ﬁrms ranking this aspect important or better) i.e. ﬁrms care
about relative prices (ii) the fear of customer retaliation (48% of the ﬁrms ranking this aspect important
or very important) and (iii) the perception that shocks might be of temporary nature (44% of the ﬁrms
ranking this aspect important or very important). Generally, our results are closer to the US than the
Euro zone, Hall et al.(2000) for UK and Apel et al.(2005) for Sweden. This should be expected given
that median frequency of price change in the US is relatively higher than elsewhere. The ideas of implicit
contracts, costly price adjustments and costly information appear at the bottom of our ranking. The latter
two theories performed especially badly in other surveys as well. For details of mean scores see Table 7B in
the Appendix.
We also asked ﬁrm owners separately if any of the relevant theories in Table 7A hindered them from
marking down prices. In response, the top two explanations stayed the same as in Table 7A. However a
diÆerent theory was ranked third (with 64% of ﬁrms choosing it) and it is that ﬁrms refrain from reducing
prices during bad times as it hurts their cash ﬂows.
These results are reasonable for Pakistan considering its higher frequency of price changes. For example,
it is hard to imagine a formal price-agreement in the manufacturing sector when the typical price duration
is only 2 months. However, in the services sector where the median price change is twice a year, explicit
contracts make more sense and were also reported as the third most mentioned reason for price stickiness.
V Factors Determining Price Adjustment
There are four key ingredients of price determination. First, what drives price changes. Second, diÆerences
in ﬁrm behavior when prices go up as opposed to when they go down. Third, the speed with which diÆerent
shocks are incorporated into prices. Fourth, the type of information used during the decision making. We
12have brieﬂy talked about points two and three in the context of demand and supply shocks but we explore
each of these aspects in detail below.
TABLE 8
The importance of factors driving price changes and lags of adjustment
Pakistan Euro Area
Manufacturing Services Overall
"†‡ # p-value§ "# p-value§ "#
Raw Material Cost 1.3§ 2§ 0.00 3§§§ 3§§§§ 0.00 2 2
Energy Cost 2§ 2§§ 0.00 2.5§§§ 3§§§§ 0.00
Competitor’s Price 2§ 2§ 0.03 3§§§ 3§§§ 0.00 3 2
Exchange Rate 2.5§§ 3§§ 0.00 2§§ 2§§§ 0.00
Demand Changes 3§§§ 2§§ 0.00 3§§§ 3§§§§ 0.24
General Price Level 3§§ 3§§ 0.18 3§§§ 3§§§§ 0.00
Labor Cost 3§§§ 3§§§ 0.00 3§§§ 3§§§§ 0.00 2 3
Financial Cost 3§§§ 3§§§ 0.00 3§§§§ 3§§§§ 0.00 3 3
Labor Productivity 3§§§ 3§§§ 0.05 3.5§§§§ 4§§§§ 0.92
‡: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote very important, important, of minor importance and unimportant respectively
†: asterisk denote *incorporated within three months, **incorporated within six months, ***incor-
porated within nine months, **** incorporated within a year.
*: Refers to null hypothesis that the mean lag of price adjustment for a given factor for price increase
is equal to price decrease.
" and #: Refer to increase and decrease in price respectively.
It is important to highlight that ﬁrms are more concerned with prices increases than reductions. Indeed,
median frequency of price decreases for manufacturing and services sectors ﬁrms over the last ﬁve years prior
to interview are 5 & 1 respectively. With this in mind, analysis on factors leading to price reductions should
be taken with a pinch of salt.
In Table 8, we report reasons which cause price changes and the approximate speeds with which these
changes pass-through to prices. The top four reasons for prices to go up or down for the manufacturing
sector are raw-material cost, energy cost, exchange rate movements and the competitor’s price. For the
services sector raw-material cost matters less while labor cost matters more due to their cost structure as we
shall explore shortly. In Table 8, we also report how quickly important changes are incorporated in prices
for these reasons. The top most important reason for a price change gets incorporated in decision-making
within a span of three months; a result we also found earlier but in a separate context. Other relatively
less important reasons are part of pricing-system within six months. In the case of the Euro area costs are
also more important but with the diÆerence that raw material and labor cost rank higher when prices go up
while raw-material costs and competitor’s price matter more when prices decrease. These diÆerences due to
focus on diÆerent costs can be explained by the nature of market and cost structures of the manufacturing
and service sector in Pakistan. We do not have equivalent speeds of adjustment available for other countries
for comparison.
Table 8 also tests the asymmetry of mean lag of prices changes for given reasons. We ﬁnd that for most
of the reasons it takes signiﬁcantly longer on average to markdown prices then markup except for general
price level in manufacturing sector, and demand changes and labor productivity for services sector.
In Table 9, we present the breakdown of ﬁrms’ cost structure in 2009. We ﬁnd that local and imported
raw-material costs account for 70% of total cost, which explains the presence of exchange rate and local costs
as prime forces driving price changes.
13TABLE 9
Percentage of total cost in 2009
Manufacturing Services Total§
Local Raw Material Cost 60 8 39
Imported Raw Material Cost 10 8 9
Energy 13 12 13
Labor 11 40 23
Other 6 32 17
Next we asked ﬁrms about the type of information they use when determining prices of their main
product. We focused on asking the extent to which price setting is based on information referring to past,
future or a combination of both past and future. This is important as it can shed light on the sources
of inﬂation persistence from the point of view of businesses. According to Table 10, 46% of ﬁrms use a
combination of past and future information. Combining this information with ﬁrms using only historical
data, 71% of the ﬁrm use backward-looking information. Breaking up this ﬁgure in sectors, we ﬁnd that
71% and 70% ﬁrms in the manufacturing and services sector respectively use backward looking rules. The
predominance of backward-looking rules in our sample contrasts with that of Fabiani et al. (2007), where
the fraction of ﬁrms practicing backward-looking pricing relative to those making price decision on the basis
of forecasted data is the reverse of what we discovered in Pakistan.
TABLE 10
Information type (% of ﬁrms)
Manufacturing Services Total Euro Area
Historical Data 27 22 25 32
Forecast 29 30 29 55
An Average of Past and Future 44 48 46
These results on price determination have important policy implications. First, for an economy that
reprices at least 12.2% of its GDP (manufacturing sector) six-times-a-year and has lower responsiveness
to ﬁnancial costs compared to exchange rate, inﬂation stabilization policies should pay more attention to
exchange rate policies. This repricing reﬂects the cost structure, where one-quarter of the inputs (imported
raw material and energy to some extent) have an exchange rate component. Second, frequent repricing by
ﬁrms may also be a reﬂection of the lack of trust on the policy-makers to stabilize an economy that has gone
through an IMF programme no less than 11 times over the last two decades.
VI Linkages with the Informal Economy
An innovative part of our survey is that we ask ﬁrms about their existence in the formal sector and their
connections with the informal sector. Employment in the informal sector accounts for 70% of non-agriculture
labor force with 21% of these jobs belonging to manufacturing type activities. Meanwhile, formal sector
employment for the manufacturing sector is 20%. Given the size of the informal economy and its overarching
presence in the manufacturing sector, it is important to understand the linkages that might exist between
the product markets of formal and informal sector.
The literature on the informal sector is mostly concentrated on the labor market (see Perry et al. (2007)
for a comprehensive review). The literature reveals four dominant views on the existence of the informal
sector: (i) dualist view, which argues that informal sector is comprised of marginal activities Hart (1973),
(ii) structuralist view in Moser (1978) and Castells and Portes (1989), which says that ﬁrms in the informal
economy are subordinates to large enterprizes in the formal sector allowing the latter to cut costs and hence
improve competitiveness, (iii) the legalist view of de Soto (1989 and 2000), which says that cost, time and
eÆort of legislation is at the source of informal sector and (iv) voluntarist view akin to Hirschman (1970), in
which entrepreneurs make a conscious decision to remain in the informal sector having done a cost-beneﬁt
analysis.
14These views lead to a variety of interplay between the formal and informal sector to explain labor market
issues in developing countries. We think that these theories are equally important for the product market
behavior; a connection ignored in the literature. The price-setting behavior in the formal sector, and hence
its consequences for inﬂation and output, would be diÆerent for structuralist view as opposed to dualist view.
The structuralist view of informality allows formal sector to be more competitive, whereas in the dualist
approach the link between formal and informal sector is nonexistent.
Realizing the important role of the interplay between formal and informal sector in determining prices,
we asked formal ﬁrms in our interviews about their views on the existence of the informal sector. In addition,
we also asked them about the extent and nature of their interaction with ﬁrms in the informal sector.
In Table 11, we can see that top three reasons ﬁrms are operating in the formal sector are: (i) customer
preferences, (ii) economies of scale and (iii) market power. Together these imply that Dixit-Stiglitz setup is
most relevant for modeling the formal sector. Surprisingly, seeking access to formal ﬁnancial and overseas
market appeared to be of little importance. The results by sector are similar.
TABLE 11
Why be part of the formal sector? (mean score†)
Manufacturing Services Total Importance‡
Economies of Scale 1.6 1.7 1.6 91%
Customer Preferences 1.8 1.6 1.7 87%
Market Power 2.2 2.1 2.2 79%
Favorable Government Policies 2.4 2.3 2.3 66%
Access to Bank Credit 2.6 2.2 2.5 67%
Access to International Market 3.2 2.2 2.9 48%
†: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote very important, important, of minor importance and unimportant
‡: percentage of ﬁrm rating the factor as important or very important.
Similarly, we presented ﬁrms with a list of possible concerns that they face in the formal sector. The
mean scores are presented in Table 12. The top three concerns for both the manufacturing and the services
sector are: (i) product standardization, (ii) costly entry and exit and (iii) discriminatory electricity charges.
TABLE 12
Concerns with staying in the formal sector (mean scores†)
Manufacturing Service Total Importance‡
Product Standardization 1.8 2.4 2.0 74%
Entry-Exit is Costly 2.1 2.5 2.2 62%
Discriminatory Energy Charges 1.9 2.7 2.2 62%
Labor Regulations 2.1 2.8 2.4 63%
Employment and Old Age Beneﬁt Contributions 2.2 2.8 2.4 58%
Bureaucratic Hurdles 2.5 3.0 2.7 43%
Price Regulations 2.6 3.0 2.8 46%
Rental Charges 3.0 3.2 3.1 30%
†: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote very important, important, of minor importance and unimportant
‡: percentage of ﬁrm rating the factor as important or very important.
We now move on to one of the most interesting part of the interview, where we asked ﬁrm owners about
their linkages with the informal sector. We ﬁnd in Table 13 that 58% and 22% of ﬁrms in the manufacturing
and services sector respectively interact with the informal economy. To put it in the aggregate context,
approximately half of ﬁrms that produce one quarter of Pakistan’s GDP are aÆected through demand or
supply channels of the informal economy. Naturally, it is important to ﬁnd out the nature of this interaction.
There are three channels of interaction (i) demand channel in which informal ﬁrms compete for market share
with their formal counterpart, (ii) supply channel in which informal ﬁrms supply inputs to formal ﬁrms and
(iii) combination of (i) and (ii).
15For the manufacturing sector 58% of ﬁrms are aÆected by the informal sector through demand and
supply channels. The nature of interaction with informal sector is weaker for the services sector with only
22% of the ﬁrms report interacting with informal ﬁrms through demand and supply channels. The results
from the services sector are expected in that the informal sector may ﬁnd it tough to reproduce and/or
co-produce intangible goods provided by their formal counterparts.
By looking at these results from the viewpoint of ﬁrm-size reveals that overall ﬁrms have similar levels
of interaction with the informal sector through demand or supply channels. But there are subtle diÆer-
ences in the type of interaction. In particular, small and medium sized ﬁrms have much bigger supply-side
interlinkages when compared with larger ﬁrms while the opposite is true for demand-side interactions.
TABLE 13
Linkages with the informal sector
Manufacturing Services Total Small Medium Large
No interaction 41.5 77.8 56.3 56.3 56.1 57.4
Demand Only 32.1 16 25.5 24.2 23.2 37.4
Supply Only 7.7 3.8 6.2 6.9 6.1 0.9
Demand and Supply 58.5 22.2 43.7 43.7 43.9 42.6
Market Share 24.8 30 26.2
Share in Total Cost 35.8 15.3 30.2
On the demand side, we ﬁnd in Table 13 that on average the market-share of the informal ﬁrms in the
manufacturing is one quarter, while for services sectors it is close to one-third. On the supply side, informal
sector provides input worth one-third of costs for all those ﬁrms using informal economy inputs. When we
asked formal ﬁrms about why they use the informal sector as a partner in their supply-chain, the top most
reply was their ‘ﬂexibility’ as input suppliers.
Finally, we asked ﬁrm owners to rank a list of reasons for the existence of the informal economy. The
scores are presented in Table 14. According to formal entrepreneurs the top four reasons for the existence
of informal sector are lack of taxes, poor compliance (hence enforcement), simple production process and
costless entry and exit respectively for the manufacturing sector. For the services sector, the top two reasons
are same but cheap labor is ranked third. Surprisingly, the least important factor for the ﬁrms to exist in
the informal sector is lack the of resources.
TABLE 14
Factors contributing to the existence of the informal economy (mean scores†)
Manufacturing Services Total Importance‡
Lack of Taxes 1.6 1.9 1.7 84%
Tax Compliance/Enforcement 1.9 2.2 2.0 82%
Simple Production Process 1.9 2.6 2.1 74%
Costless Entry and Exit 2.0 2.6 2.2 67%
Low Labor Cost 2.1 2.3 2.2 68%
Corruption 2.0 2.8 2.3 62%
Lack of Resources 2.2 2.7 2.4 61%
†: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote very important, important, of minor importance and unimportant
‡: percentage of ﬁrm rating the factor as important or very important.
Given the above results, one can conclude that according to formal ﬁrm owners, the informal sector
entrepreneurs are thriving both as producers and as input suppliers. This ﬁnding is especially relevant
for the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, formal ﬁrms with the highest level of interaction with the
informal sector also display greater degree of nominal price-rigidity (we discuss shortly). These results tend
to support the structuralist view of informality, the idea that there are input-output linkages between the
formal and informal sector, and the voluntarist view, the idea that entrepreneurs are choosing to stay out
of formal sector, as possible explanations for the existence of the informal economy. However, this can not
be conclusive as the results presented here only reﬂect the view of formal ﬁrm owners about the informal
16sector. The robustness of these ﬁndings can only be conﬁrmed with our forthcoming paper on price-setting
in the informal sector.
VII Econometrics of Pricing
To test the robustness of some of our results, we now examine how the number of price changes per year
depends on certain features of the market structure using simple OLS regressions. The features we incorpo-
rate rest on earlier discoveries and also well-known textbook theories namely: (i) ﬁrms with higher share of
market are less likely to change their prices (ii) ﬁrms claiming to be in highly competitive markets ’mark-
to-market’ and hence adjust their prices more frequently (iii) customer-markets, where ﬁrms with a larger
proportion of direct sales to clients on regular basis, have stickier prices, (iv) ﬁrms with ﬂatter marginal cost
curve are less likely to change their prices, (v) less commonly known works of Moser (1978) and Castells and
Portes (1989) argue for the structuralist view that ﬁrms in the informal economy assist larger enterprizes
in the formal sector enabling them to improve competitiveness and (vi) Hirschman (1970)’s voluntarist idea
that ﬁrms stay out of the formal sector out of choice.
To reﬂect these discoveries in our empirical model the following variables are used. To capture the size
of the ﬁrm, we have introduced two dummies for ﬁrm size, MEDIUM (set to 1 if number of employees are
between 51 to 250 for manufacturing and paid-up capital between Rs. 15-50 mln for services sector) and
LARGE (set to 1 if ﬁrm has more than 250 employees for manufacturing sector and paid-up capital more
than Rs. 50 mln for services sector). Type of economic activity is captured by MANUF dummy which is set
to 1 for ﬁrm belonging to manufacturing sector and zero otherwise. The dummy PROVINCE is set equal
to 1 for province of Punjab. The dummy variable for market share MARKET takes the value 1 if ﬁrm is
among top four ﬁrms and 0 otherwise. The share of turnover generated through direct sales to consumers is
captured in variable HH.T h ed u m m yINF takes the value 1 if ﬁrm has some interaction (either from demand
or supply sides) with informal sector of economy. The dummy for exporting ﬁrms EXP takes value 1 if ﬁrm
is exporting its main product and 0 otherwise. The Ordinary Least Square regression with frequency of price






















R2: 8.4% Number of observations= 1099 s.e.= brackets.
The number of changes in price are signiﬁcantly less for ﬁrms with higher market share. We also ﬁnd
weak evidence (p-value: 0.16) for customer market theory (Phelps and Winter, 1970) that reckons that ﬁrms
with higher share of consumers tend to have stickier prices. In a similar vein, ﬁrms exporting their main
product also tend to change prices less frequently as well as those interacting with the informal sector (Fact
12). We estimated diÆerent combinations of eq. (3) using the given set of variables, our results appear
robust to these modiﬁcations. The explanatory power of the regression remains very low (8.4 %) due to the
diversity of market environment in our economic activities ( Apel et al, 2005 also faced similar di±culties).
Previously in Table 8 we showed that overall cost related factors topped the explanations for upward price
adjustment. Next, using a probit regression we estimate the extent to which this key decision is inﬂuenced
by (for positive costs shock only13) the set of independent variables in eq. (3). The left-hand-side variable in
this scenario would be the decision to change prices upwards due to a positive a cost shock. This is captured
by the dummy, c, set to 1 if ﬁrms ranked overall cost as very important or important for adjusting price
upwards.
























R2: 16.3% Number of observations= 1167 s.e.= brackets
Probit results show that probability of changing prices upwards, given a positive cost shock, is higher for
ﬁrms belonging to the manufacturing sector as well as for those that export their main product. This result
mainly reﬂects the composition of their cost structure. The probability of changing prices upwards tends
to decreases for ﬁrms coming into direct contact with consumers in their overall customer base supporting
the customer market theory with (p-value = 0.06). This is contrary to the last model. Furthermore, ﬂatter
marginal costs imply lower probability of pass-though to prices where the variable, MC,i sad u m m ys e tt o1
for those ﬁrms indicating costs being rigid as output expands. Finally, we ﬁnd that in terms of pass-through
to price of costs shocks, any type of interaction with the informal sector is unimportant. This result does
not bode well with the structuralist view of the informal sector which emphasizes the role of informal sector
on the cost side of formal sector ﬁrms.
Next we consider the same exercise as in eq. (4) but for a demand shock, i.e. factors that determine the
probability of revising prices upwards given a positive demand shock. This eÆect is captured by the dummy,
d, which is set to 1 for ﬁrms ranking demand shocks as being either important or very important for upwards






















R2: 12.7% Number of observations= 1167 s.e.= brackets
Eq. (5) indicates that the probability of price-increments fall signiﬁcantly following a positive demand
shock when ﬁrms have higher market share, interact more with consumers directly and the informal sector
and belong to the medium-size ﬁrm category. The above evidence tends to support the voluntarist view of
the informal economy in that inﬂuence on formal sector ﬁrms’ prices is being exerted by competition from
ﬁrms in the informal economy.
VIII Caveats
The main caveat of this study is the services sector sampling frame. The frame for services sector was man-
ually constructed using a database that lacked information on number of employees and standard economic
code classiﬁcation but reported data on paid up capital. We also excluded ﬁrms that have not reported in
last ten years and selected ﬁrms with paid up capital of more than Rs. 2,000,000 introduced a bias for larger
services sector ﬁrms. For the former, this consideration would not matter more if the missing services sector
ﬁrms are distributed evenly across diÆerent economic activities. For the later, note that given our small
sample size for services sector it would not have been possible to make statistically signiﬁcant inference from
a very large population of small ﬁrms.
Another caveat is that the possibility that questions were answered in the context of higher inﬂation
environment prevailing in the country. We have already mentioned that during the survey, inﬂation was
4-6% above its historical average of 8% and continues to persist at these high levels. There are two points
18here. First, our questionnaire addressed only few questions with reference to any speciﬁc year, most of the
questions were asked about general behavior without speciﬁcation of time. And those questions that did
involve time we probed whether the reply would have been diÆerent in 2007 and 2008. We found there to be
little diÆerence. Second, it is reasonable to expect lower price-stickiness in a country with such a high steady
state inﬂation of 8%. This is corroborated by other countries (such as Canada, UK and Turkey) displaying
relatively high inﬂation rates at the time of their surveys and also reporting relatively higher price change
frequencies. Combining these two arguments, most results should also apply to normal times. Nevertheless,
a fool-proof method of meeting this concern would be to conduct a panel survey in normal times which the
central bank is committed to do in the future.
IX Conclusion
We describe results of 1189 structured interviews conducted for the manufacturing and services sectors in
the provinces of Punjab and Sindh. The sample for the manufacturing sector is fully representative while
the services sector, which is 14% of the total sample, is less so. Together, these sectors account for 71.4% of
GDP in Pakistan. We ﬁnd that although imperfect competition is a good representation of ﬁrm’s behavior,
frequency of price changes are high enough to question the role of nominal rigidities in explaining business
cycle ﬂuctuations in Pakistan. The exchange rate is more important than ﬁnancial costs in price-setting
and generally cost shocks matter more than demand shocks. Most ﬁrms use backward-looking information
while making decision on prices. Also, majority of formal ﬁrms interact with ﬁrms in the informal sector,
however manufacturing sector have a higher level of interaction with the informal sector than the services
sector. Finally, formal ﬁrms with greater interaction with the informal economy tend to increase their prices
less frequently.
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Appendix A: Post-Stratiﬁcation Scheme
Following Kwapil et al (2005) and Martins (2005) for Austria and Portugal, manufacturing sector weights








where, Ph is the number of employees in the population in stratum h, P is the total number of employees
in the population. Similarly, Sh is the number of employees in the ﬁrms interviewed in stratum h and S is
total number of employees for all the responding ﬁrms.
For services sector, the information set available is not enough to justify post-stratiﬁcation for ﬁrm-size
on the basis of employment. However, we have information on paid-up capital. We use this information
to post stratify for ﬁrm size and therefore allowing us to treat both selected economic sectors consistently.
We divided ﬁrms in services sector on the basis of paid-up capital (in local currency) as small, medium and
large ﬁrms according to > Rs.15000000, 15000000 - 50000000 and more than < 50000000 respectively.14 The








14We can draw comfort from the fact that this categorization has a correlation coe±cient of 0.5 with employment categorization
used earlier on the basis of employment data we collected from the ’surveyed’ sample.
21where, Ch is the paid-up capital of employees in the population in stratum h, C is the total paid-up
capital of services population frame. Similarly, oh is the paid-up capital in the ﬁrms interviewed in stratum
h and o is total paid-up capital of all the responding ﬁrms. The above individual weighing schemes for
the manufacturing and services sectors do not account for their share in the economy. This means that
to make inferences about price-setting for the aggregate economy, especially for those results15 that can
be aggregated, we must reweigh the results on the basis of economy-wide sector weights in Table 2. We
post-stratiﬁed the data of manufacturing and services sectors by their respective weights in population, these
results are reported under ‘total’ in our analysis.
15Note that not at all questions can be aggregated since they may simply be sector speciﬁc . For example costs breakdown
in manufacturing sector are naturally diÆerent from that of services sector and therefore can not be aggregated. Similarly, cost
speciﬁc shocks and their ramiﬁcations for pricing can not aggregated in a sensible way.
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Table 7B:
Reason for Price Stickiness
Manufacturing Services
Theories Mean p- Imp.§ Theories Mean p- Imp.§
Scores† value‡ Scores† value‡
Coordination Failure 1.8 0.00 84 Coordination Failure 1.9 0.00 79





2.7 0.89 46 Explicit Contracts 2.9 0.17 44
Procyclical Elasticities 2.7 0.03 44 Temporary Shocks 3.0 0.66 39
Habit Formation 2.8 0.89 40 Procyclical Elasticities 3.0 0.38 40
Constant Unit Cost 2.8 0.20 40 Habit Formation 3.0 0.00 31
Delivery Time 2.9 0.07 41 Thick Markets 3.2 0.01 29
External Financing 3.0 0.00 39 Constant Unit Cost 3.4 0.53 22
Using Inventories 3.1 0.84 30 Informal Sector Coordina-
tion Failure
3.4 0.42 22
Explicit Contracts 3.1 0.88 31 Implicit Contracts 3.5 0.57 19
Thick Markets 3.2 0.49 27 External Financing 3.5 0.09 19
Informal Sector Coordina-
tion Failure
3.2 0.00 28 Costly Information Gath-
ering
3.6 0.54 12
Implicit Contracts 3.4 0.00 22 Menu Costs 3.6 0.02 5
Costly Information Gath-
ering
3.6 0.00 13 Delivery Time 3.7 0.00 12
Menu Costs 3.7 8 Using Inventories 3.8 6
†: 1, 2, 3 and 4 denote very important, important, of minor importance and unimportant
‡: refers to the null hypothesis that theory’s mean score is equal to the theory just ranked below.
*: percentage of ﬁrm rating the theory as important or very important.
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A1. How many products does your ﬁrm produce (or sell)?
A2. What is your ”main product” in Pakistan?
A3. In your total turnover/sales, what is the percentage of turnover/sales in Pakistan due to your ”main
product”? %
A4. What is the most important market (in terms of turnover) for your ”main product”? (Please circle
one option)
11. ”Local market” (city & surrounding areas)
12. ”National” market
2. International market
A6. With reference to your ”main product” and the Pakistani market, how would you rank your ﬁrm,
in terms of market share?
1. The top ﬁrm
2. One of the top 4 ﬁrms
3. One of the top 10 ﬁrms
4. Not among the top 10 ﬁrms
8. Do not know
A7. How would you characterize the degree of competition for your main product in the Pakistani





5. Very weak or no competition
8. Do not know
A8. In what percentage, the turnover generated by your ”main product” is due to sales to? (There can
be more than one answer but the percentages should sum up to 100 percent)
1. Other ﬁrms %
2. Through retailers/wholesalers %
3. Through your own distribution network or through net-
work under your control
%





A9. With reference to your ”main product”, what is the share of your regular customers (customers
with whom you have been doing business for more than one year) in diÆerent groups?
Long-term Customers
1. Other ﬁrms (including retail/wholesale sector): %
2. Consumers (only for ﬁrms which sell their products directly to the public): %
3. Government %
24A12. With reference to your main product what was the cost structure of production in 2009?
1. Local raw material %
2. Imported raw material %
3. Energy %
4. Labour %
5. Other cost %
Total = 100%
B2. How do you normally set the price of your main product? (Please circle one option)
1. We add a constant mark-up to the average variable production costs (cost of labour and cost of the
other inputs) and change the price when there is a change in cost (mark-up pricing)
2. Under normal circumstances, we use constant mark up. However, when the variable costs change to
such a large extent that they cannot be accommodated in price change, we change the mark-up
3. The market is very competitive; therefore we set our price in accordance with the market price level
4. The price is regulated administratively by the government
5. The price is regulated administratively by the associations
6. The price is negotiated mainly with our customers
B3. Do you base your pricing decisions on data from previous years or on forecasts?
1. Data from previous years
2. On forecasts
3. An average of past data and forecast
C1. We assume that companies review their prices from time to time, but they do not necessarily change
them. Do you review the price of your main product..........
1. Regularly?
2. On speciﬁc occasions (e.g. when costs change considerably)?
3. In general regularly and also on speciﬁc occasions (e.g. signiﬁcant changes in costs
or demand)?
4. We never review prices without the need to change them.







7. Less frequently than yearly
D1. How often do you change the price of your main product on average in a year? Times
E1. Which factors would increase the price of your ”main product”? (Circle one option in each case)
25Very Important Of minor Un-
Important Importance important
1. An increase in the cost of labour 1 2 3 4
2. An increase in the cost of raw materials
(excl. energy)
12 3 4
3. An increase in energy prices 1 2 3 4
4. An increase in ﬁnancial/capital costs 1 2 3 4
5. A rise in demand 1 2 3 4
6. An increase in competitors’ prices 1 2 3 4
7. An increase in overall cost of production 1 2 3 4
8. An increase in general price level 1 2 3 4
9. A decrease in competition 1 2 3 4
10. A decrease in labour productivity 1 2 3 4
11. A depreciation of PKR 1 2 3 4
E2. How quickly do you increase the price of your ”main product” in response to the factors mentioned
below? (Circle one option in each case)
Within 1 Within 3 Within 6 Within 9 Within 1 No
Month Months Months Months Year Change
1. An increase in the cost of labour 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. An increase in the cost of raw materi-
als (excl. energy)
12 3456
3. An increase in energy prices 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. An increase in ﬁnancial/capital costs 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. A rise in demand 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. An increase in competitors’ prices 1 2 3 4 5 6
7. An increase in overall cost of produc-
tion
12 3456
8. An increase in general price level 1 2 3 4 5 6
9. A decrease in competition 1 2 3 4 5 6
10. A decrease in labour productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6
11. A depreciation of PKR 1 2 3 4 5 6
E3. Which factors would contribute to a decrease in the price of your ”main product”? (Circle one
option in each case)
Very Important Of minor Un-
Important Importance important
1. A decrease in the cost of labour 1 2 3 4
2. A decrease in the cost of raw materials
(excl. energy)
12 3 4
3. A decrease in energy prices 1 2 3 4
4. A decrease in ﬁnancial/capital costs 1 2 3 4
5. A decrease in demand 1 2 3 4
6. A decrease in competitors’ prices 1 2 3 4
7. A decrease in overall cost of production 1 2 3 4
8. A decrease in general price level 1 2 3 4
9. An increase in competition 1 2 3 4
10. An increase in labour productivity 1 2 3 4
11. An appreciation in PKR 1 2 3 4
26E4. How quickly do you decrease the price of your ”main product” in response to the factors mentioned
below? (Circle one option in each case)
Within 1 Within 1 Within 1 Within 9 Within 1 No
Month Months Months Months Year Change
1. A decrease in the cost of labour 1 2 3 4 5 6
2. A decrease in the cost of raw materials
(excl. energy)
12 3456
3. A decrease in energy prices 1 2 3 4 5 6
4. A decrease in ﬁnancial/capital costs 1 2 3 4 5 6
5. A decrease in demand 1 2 3 4 5 6
6. A decrease in competitors’ prices 1 2 3 4 5 6
7. A decrease in overall cost of produc-
tion
12 3456
8. A decrease in general price level 1 2 3 4 5 6
9. An increase in competition 1 2 3 4 5 6
10. An increase in labour productivity 1 2 3 4 5 6
11. An appreciation in PKR 1 2 3 4 5 6
E5. Once you have decided that it is necessary to change the price upward of your “main product”,
which of the factors listed below might lead to a delay in the actual price change? (Please indicate their
importance in your ﬁrm to each answer by choosing one option per row)
27Theories Reasons for postponing price increase Very Important Of minor Un-
Important Importance important
1. Firms watch what other ﬁrms will
do ﬁrst
12 3 4
2. Firms avoid price changes if they
perceive a shock (demand or sup-
ply) to be transitory
12 3 4
3. Customer might take the price
change as exploitative and antag-
onize
12 3 4
4. When times are good customers
become more price sensitive
12 3 4
5. When times are good share
of non-habitual customers with
higher price elasticities increases
12 3 4
6. When unit cost is constant, price
markups do not change
12 3 4
7. Prices are ﬁxed for a time interval
by contract
12 3 4
8. In good times external ﬁnancing
is cheaper allowing markups to be
constant
12 3 4
9. Firms vary delivery lags before
they make price adjustment
12 3 4
10. Firms vary inventories to avoid
price adjustments
12 3 4
11. In good times the ratio of re-
lationship costs to output sold
is lower allowing ﬁrms to keep
markups constant
12 3 4
12. Firms watch what competing
ﬁrms in the informal sector would
do
12 3 4
13. Firms have invisible agreement to
maintain prices at a certain level
12 3 4
14. Firms incur cost of acquiring in-
formation that would allow them
to adjust prices
12 3 4
15. Firms incur cost of adjusting
prices
12 3 4




F5. Nature of your interaction with the informal sector is that a fraction of intermediate good used in
production is purchased from the informal economy
1. Yes
2. No 2
28F6. The share in the total cost of the informal intermediate good(s) in the production of your main
product is: %
F9. What factors motivate you to stay in the formal economy? (Please circle one option)
Very Important Of minor Un-
Important Importance important
1. Large scale production 1 2 3 4
2. Customers prefer to buy from registered producers 1 2 3 4
3. Favorable government policies 1 2 3 4
4. Access to bank and credit 1 2 3 4
5. Access to int’l market 1 2 3 4
6. Market power 1 2 3 4
7. Other (please specify) 12 3 4
F10. What issues are associated with operating in the formal sector? (Please circle only one option in
each)
Very Important Of minor Un-
Important Importance important
1. Contribution to EOBI 1 2 3 4
2. Labour regulations 1 2 3 4
3. Standardization of product 1 2 3 4
4. Land charges or rental value 1 2 3 4
5. Bureaucratic hurdles 1 2 3 4
6. Discriminatory energy charges 1 2 3 4
7. Entry-exit is costly 1 2 3 4
8. Price regulations 1 2 3 4
9. Other Specify 12 3 4
F11. In your opinion what factors contribute to the existence of the informal sector? (Please circle only
one option in each)
Very Important Of minor Un-
Important Importance important
1. Low labour cost 1 2 3 4
2. No taxes 1 2 3 4
3. Lack of resources (Physical capital, human capital) 1 2 3 4
4. Corruption 1 2 3 4
5. Non compliance of existing regulation 1 2 3 4
6. Cost less entry-exit 1 2 3 4
7. Simple production process 1 2 3 4
8. Other Specify 12 3 4
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